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Abstract 
Risk assessment methods have been widely used in various industries, and they play a significant role in improving 
the safety performance of systems. However, the outcomes of risk assessment approaches are subject to uncertainty 
and ambiguity due to the complexity and variability of system behaviour, scarcity of quantitative data about 
different system parameters, and human involvement in the analysis, operation, and decision-making processes. The 
implications for improving system safety are slowly being recognised; however, research on uncertainty handling 
during both qualitative and quantitative risk assessment procedures is a growing field. This paper presents a review 
of the state of the art in this field, focusing on uncertainty handling in fault tree analysis (FTA) based risk 
assessment. Theoretical contributions, aleatory uncertainty, epistemic uncertainty, and integration of both epistemic 
and aleatory uncertainty handling in the scientific and technical literature are carefully reviewed. The emphasis is on 
highlighting how assessors can handle uncertainty based on the available evidence as an input to FTA.  
Keywords: Process safety, Uncertainty, Fault Tree Analysis, Risk Assessment, Bayesian theorem, Fuzzy set theory, 
Evidence theory. 
1. Introduction                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Uncertainty is an unavoidable part of any risk assessment technique, especially in probabilistic methods where 
uncertainty is a key part of the risk description. Risk is often defined as the combination of the probability of an 
uncertain, undesired outcome and the severity of that that outcome [1]. The term uncertainty expresses doubt, e.g., in 
the early design stages, an analyst may be uncertain about the failure rate of a new or a partially defined component. 
Moreover, uncertainty conveys lack of knowledge, e.g. we are very likely to know a chemical is toxic, but less likely 
to know what the effects might be if released in low concentrations into the environment.  
The term uncertainty is applied in different ways in different fields, such as engineering, philosophy, science, and 
economics. Uncertainty is defined by the U.S. National Research Council as the “lack or incompleteness of 
information.  Quantitative uncertainty assessment attempts to analyze and describe the degree to which a calculated 
value may differ from the true value; it sometimes uses probability distributions. Uncertainty depends on the quality, 
quantity, and relevance of data and on the reliability and relevance of models and assumptions” [2].  
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Numerous studies have been performed using mathematical models to examine uncertainty in the outcomes of 
quantitative risk assessment techniques. Uncertainty is often an integral part of these models, since making 
deterministic predictions regarding the future is essentially impossible.  Instead, probabilistic data — often based on 
past experience — is used to model assumptions and predict future events. For example, the likelihood of failure of 
an engineering system may be modelled on the basis of the failure rates of its constituent components. In such cases, 
natural variability or randomness forces us to use probabilistic models to account for uncertainty regarding the 
outcome.  
There are two main perceptions of uncertainty distinguished in a risk assessment procedure: (i) uncertainty related to 
physical mutability, and (ii) uncertainty related to the limitations on the knowledge of the system experts. The first 
category is the objectivity, which is commonly known as “aleatory uncertainty”. It describes the uncertainty inherent 
in the random behaviour of many physical processes, such as the unpredictability of weather conditions and the 
occurrence of specific hardware failures due to wear and tear. Aleatory uncertainty can also be known as accidental 
uncertainty, characteristic uncertainty, and intolerable and unbearable uncertainty. This type of uncertainty is 
perceived when the same experiment is re-run under the same circumstances, yet different outcomes are obtained 
each time. Some degree of objective uncertainty is inevitable and can never be fully removed from a model; at best 
it can only be reduced. The second category is uncertainty related to the lack of knowledge or subjectivity, 
commonly known as “epistemic uncertainty”. It is associated with the indecisiveness, ambiguity or fuzziness 
regarding the quality of a risk assessment technique. This type of uncertainty can be decreased as time passes and 
decision makers gain more knowledge.  
Ferson and Ginzburg [3] provide an example to illustrate the differences between aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties. As part of an extinction risk assessment for an endangered species of owl, different questions were 
posed, each exemplifying different forms of uncertainty. For example, the question "Do mortality mechanisms 
change from season to season?" represents the aleatory uncertainty with respect to the underlying variability of the 
situation being investigated. Since the seasonal weather and its effect on the owls is unpredictable, there is inherent 
uncertainty in determining the owls' mortality rate. In this case the uncertainty is due to the temporal variability — 
the data changing over time —  but it can equally be due to any other form of variability, e.g. spatial (how the data 
varies from location to location) or population-based (how the data varies from one individual to the next). On the 
other hand, the question "What is the number of owls present in the forest?" represents the epistemic uncertainty 
arising from the fact that we do not have perfect and complete information about the situation being studied: 
although there is a fixed and definite number of owls in the forest at a given moment of time, we do not necessarily 
know what that number is (because of the difficulty in tracking every owl in the forest). However, unlike the 
aleatory uncertainty, we can reduce the epistemic uncertainty here through additional study, e.g. by use of improved 
owl population tracking mechanisms. 
Among the different probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods, FTA is the most-widely used approach for 
system safety and reliability evaluation. Using FTA it is possible to determine the probability of any undesired 
events, also known as top event, given the probability of the basic events, which are the lowest-level event causes. 
3 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to quantify the failure probability of each basic event to be able to measure the probability 
of the top event. Criticality of the basic events can also be determined by calculating their relative contributions to 
the occurrence of the top event. The credibility of the results of the FTA-based risk assessment could be undermined 
due to the presence of the above-mentioned uncertainties. For instance, due to the lack of knowledge about the 
system under study, uncertainties, as imprecision and incompleteness, can be present in the parameters (e.g. failure 
rate data) used in the FTA. At the same time, the complexity of systems and lack of knowledge about the behaviour 
of the system often lead to simplification of assumptions during analysis. For instance, FTA assumes that events are 
independent, which is often an unrealistic assumption and it introduces uncertainties in the data and the modelling 
when using FTA. Moreover, in FTA, since the logical structure of fault trees (use of AND/OR gates) is specified by 
humans, there is a possibility of introducing structural error leading to model uncertainty. All these uncertainties can 
propagate from the lower level of the fault tree to the top level of the tree. Therefore, to improve the credibility of 
the results of FTA, uncertainties are required to be handled. The issue of uncertainty in FTA has not gone unnoticed 
and several methodologies have been proposed to address this issue in many different ways. Approaches that are 
used to handle uncertainty in FTA include, but not limited to, fuzzy set theory, evidence theory, Bayesian network, 
etc. Fuzzy set theory has been widely used to handle data uncertainty FTA and reviews of fuzzy set-based FTA is 
available in [4,5]. Other approaches such as Bayesian networks, evidence theory, and combination of multiple 
approaches to handle uncertainty in FTA are not reviewed in the past. This paper aims to provide a review of 
different approaches for uncertainty handling in FTA-based risk assessment. Although the primary focus of this 
paper is to review the advancements in uncertainty handling in fault tree based risk assessment, other closely related 
approaches that handles aleatory and/or epistemic uncertainty have also been reviewed briefly. For instance, generic 
fundamental and theoretical contributions towards uncertainty analysis is also reviewed. For brevity, the literature 
related to fuzzy FTA that are reviewed in [4,5] are excluded in this paper. The review of the uncertainty handling 
approaches presented in this paper shows the context in which each technique may be more appropriate and 
highlights the overall potential usefulness of them in addressing uncertainty in risk assessment. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the review methodology used in this paper is explained. 
Theoretical contributions are then reported in section 3. Methodological and experimental contributions related to 
epistemic uncertainty handling in probabilistic risk assessments are covered in section 4. Section 5 reports on 
advancements in handling aleatory uncertainty. Section 6 focuses on works which integrate both epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainty.  Finally, discussion and concluding remarks are provided in section 7, concentrating on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the different types of approaches.  
2. The review methodology  
In conventional indexing systems, including Web of Science and Scopus, risk assessment and uncertainty are not 
reflected as a specific category. Instead, contributions connected with risk assessment are characteristically recorded 
under “mathematics”, “social sciences” or “engineering”. Therefore, common queries of those systems using 
expressions like “uncertainty”, and “risk assessment” return many results covering a broad range of domains. Thus, 
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an additional review procedure has been applied, concentrating on particular journals publishing studies on risk 
assessment approaches, quantitative and qualitative risk assessment, the foundations of risk assessment, and 
uncertainty handling in risk assessment techniques. To identify the relevant journals, a proper procedure was 
engaged as explained in [6] based on the five keywords “risk”, “risk analysis”, “risk assessment”, “risk 
management”, and “safety”. Additionally, an online journal ranking tool SJR (https://www.scimagojr.com/) was 
utilized to recognize appropriate and associated journals using the keywords “risk assessment” and “uncertainty” in 
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Figure 1. Flow chart of review methodology  
The review was completed in January 2019, thus later publications are not included. Papers chosen for review were 
chosen using the following search expression: Publication Name = “full title of the journal name”, (e.g., “Process 
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Safety and Environmental Protection”), Document Type = “article”, Topic = “risk assessment” AND “Uncertainty”. 
Since “fault tree analysis” is the main probabilistic risk assessment technique being focused upon, the reviewed 
publications were classified in four categories. The initial category covered theoretical contributions, including the 
foundation of uncertainty in risk assessment and how uncertainty can be determined from a theoretical idea. The 
second category covered methodological and experimental contributions, representing works discussing the methods 
for epistemic uncertainty handling in fault tree analysis. The third category covered papers discussing aleatory 
uncertainty handling in risk assessment. Finally, the fourth category focuses on works which address an integration 
of both uncertainties handling in FTA. These four categories are explored in turn by the following four sections of 
this paper.  
3. Theoretical and fundamental contributions 
This section discusses the meaning of uncertainty based on theoretical and fundamental contributions, focusing 
specifically on the use of uncertainty in probabilistic risk assessment methods. Uncertainty is a key issue in any risk 
assessment technique [7]. Uncertainty is a typical expression in routine conversation, where it can mean different 
things in different contexts. However, for risk assessment techniques, the meaning of uncertainty is still a matter for 
discussion [8]. Based on an overview, uncertainty in typical risk assessment techniques can be divided into three 
categories, including consequences, probabilities, and human judgment. In some applications uncertainty and 
ambiguity are treated as similar concepts. Therefore, we can define two types of uncertainty related to the 
consequences of an unexpected event: interpretative and normative [9]. The latter refers to the different perspectives 
related to the tolerance of risk. Interpretative uncertainty refers to the variability in interpreting assessment outputs, 
e.g. due to decision makers processing of risk analysis results based on their own perspective and assumptions, such 
as whether a given consequence is harmful or not.  
The third category of uncertainty refers to the lack of certainty in probabilistic assessment. The quality of 
information, weights of evidence, or source of reliability data in the risk assessment are all examples [10]. Basili 
[11] and Dubois [12] used some risk assessment techniques to illustrate this issue. Another version of this concept 
relates uncertainty to impreciseness in subjective expressions, e.g. ambiguity in the description of rare events [13]. 
In addition, non-probabilistic approaches have been extensively developed, such as fuzzy logic and possibility 
theory [14,15], which are explained  in later sections.  
The last conception of uncertainty is related to human judgment, which describes the definition of probability in 
expert judgments, and uncertainty in the processing of information. Catrinu and Nordgård [16] state that uncertainty 
in a risk assessment procedure reflects the impression in human judgment regarding the preferences, values, and 
attitudes to risk, which can arise because of lack of sufficient understanding of problems, modelling assumptions, 
and so on. In addition,  Richter and Koch [17] studied the role of safety culture on companies’ interpretation and 
handling of risks and accidents.  
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In theory, aleatory uncertainty cannot be reduced, while epistemic uncertainty can be reduced once more knowledge 
and information is available. However, many types of uncertainty were categorized as aleatory in the past but are 
now considered as epistemic. This fact means that the categorizing and classification of uncertainty has no fixed 
border [18]. In this regard, some scholars take the position that most uncertainty is epistemic [19,20].  
Three further categories of uncertainty — model, parameter, and completeness uncertainty — can be produced as a 
result of a risk analysis. However, there is no exact borderline to distinguish between them. Accordingly, any effort 
to handle uncertainty within each type may affect the others. Jin et al. [21] indicated that using multi-parameter 
distribution in place of an eventual distribution can decrease the uncertainty in some types of model, but on the other 
hand more parameter uncertainty may be produced.   
Completeness uncertainty is associated with the overall risk assessment quality, its main purposes and domain, and 
the method by which its analyses are achieved. In completeness uncertainty, uncertainty may be further 
distinguished as recognized and unrecognized completeness uncertainty. The first refers to the factors that are 
completely recognized, but deliberately not included. The reason for an exception can be lack of sufficient 
understanding in its operating setting, cost or time restrictions, absence of information in order to assist the models, 
or lack of capability in utilizing the models. Thus, recognized uncertainty represents assumptions and simplifications 
related to costs, accessible resources, capabilities of analysis, and the information and knowledge about the 
operating environment and the system.  
The next form of uncertainty, model uncertainty, is based on the fact that any model, whether mathematical, 
theoretical, or conceptual, will inevitably be only a simplistic representation of reality. Model uncertainty is intended 
to signify different models including stochastic models for system input, structural models of the system, spreading 
models, human behaviour models, accident models, etc. [22]. Deterministic and probabilistic are two key forms of 
this type of uncertainty and both are used in a risk assessment procedure. Deterministic models are typically 
considered to depict physical phenomena, e.g. pressure build up and physical influence. In contrast, life distribution 
of a component and wind direction can be considered as probabilistic models.  
Finally, parameter uncertainty is linked to the uncertainty of parameter values commonly used in quantitative 
analyses. Such parameters can include failure rates for the different types of equipment as well as several failure 
modes, intervals between tests, probabilities of human error, effects of influencing factors, and frequencies of 
natural data.   
In the rest of this section, some of the contributions to the fundamental understanding of uncertainty in risk 
assessment techniques are discussed. 
In one of the earliest studies, Bari and Park [23] characterized uncertainty of data for probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) techniques. They proposed an approach according to the provided information and maximum entropy theory 
for dealing with uncertainty under certain circumstances. In 1996, RESS had a specific issue related to uncertainty in 
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risk and reliability titled “Treatment of Aleatory and Epistemic Uncertainty- Volume 54, Issues 2–3”. Published 
within were a number of attempts devoted to uncertainty modelling. As an example, Parry [24] characterized the 
uncertainty in PRA of complex systems such as chemical process plants and nuclear plants. He distinguished 
between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty using a simple example in order to recognize the importance of 
interpretation of the results of a PRA. Zio and Apostolakis [25] proposed a mathematical formulation for the 
handling of model uncertainty which represented enough capability to provide valuable understanding and organized 
direction to the expert judgment elicitation process. However, they stated that the approach relies on a clear 
understanding about the differences between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty. Paté-Cornell [26] examined six 
levels of analytical completeness in uncertainty handling in PRA and the possibility of transferring experience 
between the fields of application. This paper described the methods of treatment based on both deterministic and 
probabilistic uncertainties and also the different viewpoints that shape these assessments. In the same issue of RESS, 
Winkler  [27] discussed the uncertainty in PRA at two different levels: a basic level and a practical level. At a basic 
level, uncertainty is just uncertainty and at this level, any attempt to make a distinction between the types of 
uncertainty can be questionable. At the second level, the distinctions between different types of uncertainties are 
guided by significant modeling subjects like as structure modeling, probability assessment, and sensitivity analysis.  
Two years later, Renn [28] explained the role of risk perception with consideration of uncertainty handling for risk 
management. Morgan [29] provided the commentary and description of uncertainty analysis in risk assessment 
techniques. Murphy [30] commented on three laws proposed by Hattis [31] on risk assessment, including (i) 
“application of standard statistical data to a single data only a trivial proportion of the overall uncertainty in the 
parameter value”, (ii) “any estimate of the uncertainty of a parameter value will always itself be more uncertain than 
the estimate of the parameter value”, and (iii) “uncertainty in the uncertainty”. Carrington and Bolger [32] discussed 
the topic as uncertainty and risk assessment. Firstly, they answered three important questions: “why is uncertainty 
part of risk assessment?”, “why uncertainty is usually omitted?”, and “why it is important to give uncertainty special 
notice?”. Then a brief description of communication of uncertainty and computation of uncertainty was explained.  
In 1999, Reckhow [33] discussed the importance of risk assessment techniques and uncertainty for improving 
environmental decision making. Furthermore, the number of lessons that decision makers could learn from risk 
assessment according to the uncertainty was explained. In the next decade, Reid [34] described the perceptions of 
confidence level and risk regarding the epistemological foundation of risk assessment and the uncertainty related to 
the approximation and description of risks. Flage and Aven [35] suggested an alternative method according to 
uncertainty and risk description, because decision making under uncertainty is the significant characteristic of 
project, safety, and uncertainty management. Their proposed approach made use of risk assessment and economic 
optimization tools such as the predictable net present value, but recognize the need for a comprehensive risk 
management procedure which extends outside the evaluation. Aven and Renn [36] discussed the role of qualitative 
risk assessment (QRA) due to risk and uncertainty characterization, and define suitable risk management options 
which specially emphasize the risk of terrorism. In a similar manner, Jones-Lee and Aven [37] discussed the task of 
civic cost-benefit assessment in societal decision making with respect to considerable uncertainties. Cooke [38] 
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introduced a set of conundrums in relation to uncertainty factors in the integrated risk information system (IRIS) 
database. In another study, Cooke [39] discussed that using an improper methodology or even more un-
methodological use of uncertain data will not be able to handle and contribute to the rational consensus. The five 
principles, including reproducibility, accountability, empirical control, neutrality, and fairness reported in his study 
represented an attempt to formulate a uniform guideline for using uncertain data in decision-making science. 
Recently, a comprehensive review [40] has been done to highlight the overall potential productivity of available 
methods in handling and managing the uncertainties in subjective safety and reliability engineering techniques. It 
simply concluded that merely an integration of methods could properly deal with the aforementioned principles. 
Aven [41] described different ways of defining and describing risk. Probability as the conventional perspective in 
engineering communities is highlighted; however, the study is also discussed that the given definitions and 
standpoints are excessively narrow.  Thus, the probability component of the risk conception has to be substituted 
with uncertainty. In addition, by dealing with probability in such a limited way, uncertainty concepts can be easily 
ignored and shortened.  Aven [42] also addressed both types of uncertainty as a requirement for PRA to handle 
variability. In another study, Markowski et al. [43] explained the sources of uncertainties in  risk assessment of 
process safety areas. They signified that the important subjects in risk assessment outputs in different process safety 
applications are both uncertainties of input data and simulation models. 
In 2011, Aven contributed to uncertainty handling in risk assessment techniques in five different papers. These 
contributions include drawing attention to the need for a proper risk perspective for resilience engineering [44]; 
introducing several types of uncertainties in the framework of the protective values [45]; recommending some ideas 
to improve the methodology and practice of selective critique of risk assessment based on uncertainty issues [46]; 
arguing that ISO 31000 failed in different approaches to produce reliable and expressive definitions of several key 
concept of uncertainty in risk assessment techniques [47]; and recognizing whether the analysts’ or the experts’ 
uncertainty assessments should be reported by risk assessment techniques [48].  In [49], Aven reviewed the 
definitions of risk-related concepts including the concept of uncertainty. 
In 2013, Aven had made further contributions to the field of uncertainty analysis in risk assessment. Firstly, they 
discussed how the concept of risk with respect to numerous performers can affect risk communication related to risk 
assessment and risk management procedures [50]. A framework was proposed in [51] to better understand risk 
assessment and uncertainty according to four key issues: data, information, knowledge, and wisdom. Aven also 
explained how decision makers can cope with deep uncertainties, known probabilities, and correct models in risk 
assessment and risk management procedures [52]. Another study had introduced the practical implications of new 
risk perspectives, because many arguments have been widely made for the adoption of certain new types of risk 
perspective [53]. A novel method is introduced for uncertainty handling in the risk assessment technique which is 
applicable to a tunnel project [54]. 
The foundation issues in PRA as two key steps are introduced and discussed in [55] which highlights (i) reviewing 
and deliberating the current situations, and (ii) recognizing how to best advance in the future to progress the risk 
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correction in the required direction. A new approach was introduced for treating model uncertainties for QRA in 
[56]. The approach follows the theoretical outline where a distinction is made between model error, model 
prediction, and model output uncertainty. Aven also discussed the implication of the black swans theory to the 
practice and foundation of risk assessment techniques in different contexts, including (i) unknown unknowns, (ii) 
unknown knowns, and (iii) events that are judged to have an insignificant occurrence probability [55,57,58]. Black 
swan theory was further discussed in [59]. In the paper, the authors provided a short communication to represent the 
restriction of black swan concepts to unknown unknowns.  
Aven and Ylönen implemented a new risk perspective in order to give decision makers better insights about 
information, lack of information, and risk dimension [60]. A methodological comparison has been made for risk 
assessment under deep uncertainties using an ordinary example to show how the variances of each method is linked 
to the conventional risk assessment procedure [61], [62].  
As can be seen from above mentioned reviews, the concepts of risk assessment based on uncertainty are well-
defined and numerous developments have been made to cope with any available methodological shortcomings. 
Rather than the idea, it is time to shift the focus forward onto risk management using diverse approaches like 
adaptive risk management and robustness and resilience management. In this regard, risk management can be useful 
outside of the conventional risk assessment techniques. In addition to such methods that are available in the 
literature, QRA highlights signals and warnings such as deviations in assumption and potential concerns about the 
system.  
4. Methodological and empirical contributions to epistemic uncertainty 
handling  
As mentioned earlier, epistemic uncertainty is produced by knowledge deficits and in principle may be eliminated 
when decision makers can obtain proper knowledge about the object of study. It should be noted that there is no 
fixed border between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty. However, many studies found it useful to categorize 
uncertainty, as described earlier, and accordingly it is possible to identify appropriate solution technique to deal with 
the uncertainty. The main purpose of distinguishing between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties is that in 
mathematical terms it is much more correct [63]. In other words, combining epistemic and aleatory uncertainties 
means that a decision maker will not be able to see how much of the whole uncertainty comes from each of them. 
There are two available basic concepts: frequency-based and Bayesian. For frequency-based approaches, including 
statistical and fuzzy-based approaches, the idea of probability is defined as a restricting occurrence rate and can be 
applied if a decision maker could recognize an independent sample in a studied population; whereas Bayesian 
thoughts define probability as the degree of belief. Furthermore, supporting information includes statistical data, 
physical models, as well as  experts’ opinions [26]. The three strategies most commonly used to deal with epistemic 
uncertainty are presented as follows. 
10 
 
4.1. Subjective uncertainty handling using probability distribution  
During risk assessment, the failure behaviour of the system is often explained using different probability 
distributions. Lognormal distribution is a probability distribution widely used for this purpose. However, normal 
distributions are also useful in order to compute the basic event (BE) probability in FTA. In one study [39], it was 
illustrated that if an expert estimated the failure probabilities for at least 14 of the 39 components, then the 
distribution of outcomes in the corresponding experiment can be approximated with a normal distribution.  
In some applications, the nature of the quantities whose distributions are assessed may be such as to suggest a 
particular class of probability distributions. This specific implementation presupposes that the experts’ distributions 
are approximately normal; however, the idea may be applied to any class of distributions determined by two 
parameters. The study preferred to break the elicitation down into two steps: (1) the employed expert indicates a best 
estimate of the failure frequency in question in subjective way; and (2) he/she indicates “how certain” one is of the 
best estimate to obtain confidence level. Additionally, there was a preference for qualitative as well as quantitative 
elicitation procedures. The elicitation was broken down into two steps in a similar way: (1) the expert is asked for 
his/her median estimation of the failure frequency in question (his/her answer is high); and (2) the expert is asked 
how surprised he/she would be if the true value turned out to be higher by a factor of 10 or more, which reflects the 
probability that the true value should exceed the median by a factor of 10 or more.  
In other words, it is assumed there is a probability density 𝑝(𝑥, 𝑦) giving the probability density that the true value is 
𝑥, that the expert estimates this value as 𝑦 with standard deviation 𝜎 through all BEs. The expert may be subjected 
to various biases, but in the simplest case he/she is unbiased. In this case, Cooke [39] assumed that if the true value 
is 𝑥 and the expert gives standard deviation 𝜎, then the probability that he estimates 𝑥 as 𝑦, 𝑝(𝑦|𝑥, 𝜎) is the normal 
distribution with mean 𝑥 and standard deviation 𝜎: 







      (1) 
Thus, it seems reasonable to say this: if an unbiased expert's subjective distribution is normal having mean as 𝑦 and 
standard deviation as 𝜎, with 𝑦 and 𝜎 fixed, for a large number of failure frequencies, then if the true values for 
these frequencies were examined, they will indeed be normally distributed having mean as 𝑦 and standard deviation 
as 𝜎 [64]. For such an expert: 







      (2) 
The normal density depends only on the square distance to the mean and the standard deviation, hence: 𝑝(𝑦|𝑥, 𝜎) =
𝑝(𝑥|𝑦, 𝜎). The authors could not find any attempt which has been made to compute the failure rate of basic events in 
a typical FTA using subjective elicitation.  
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4.2. Subjective uncertainty handling using fuzzy logic based approaches 
Fuzzy set theory was proposed by Zadeh as an alternative to the conventional probability theory which was 
recognized as unsuitable for representing all types of uncertainties [65]. In this concept, it is possible to describe 
linguistic terms as fuzzy numbers and it has enough capability to be assumed as an extension of the traditional 
probability theory due to its ability to represent imprecise values using continuous membership functions such as 
triangular and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers [66,67].  
In the literature, there are many studies stating that fuzzy logic is founded on the concept of partial membership 
degree in a numerical set. This membership is typically described as membership function and is belongs to interval 




Figure 2. Convectional set and fuzzy set for safe and unsafe state (adopted from [68,70,71]) 
For example, a triangular fuzzy number illustrated in Figure 3 is the simple shape and accordingly shows the 
uncertainty in the possibility estimation of a basic event in typical FTA. The fuzzy vector 𝐴 = (𝑃𝐿 , 𝑃𝑚, 𝑃𝑈) signifies 
the lower, most likely, and the upper boundary, respectively. By engaging Equation (4), the membership degree of 
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                (4) 
where 𝑋∗ means that the defuzzified output, 𝜇𝐴(𝑥) is denoted as a membership function, and 𝑥 is considered the 
output variable.  
Fuzzy logic can handle subjective uncertainty in different ways during the risk assessment procedure. The first one 
is the subjective elicitation process, which has the same concept as the lognormal distribution method. It means that 
each employed expert expresses their opinion about the possibility of occurrence of the BEs in a FT in the form of 
qualitative terms. Subsequently, the qualitative terms are transferred into a set of fuzzy numbers. If a group of 
experts is used for the eliciting process, an aggregation procedure is applied in the fuzzy environment. Then, a 
defuzzification method is used to reach to the crisp value. However, this crisp value is based on possibility; thus, 
using Onisawa’s equation the possibility can be transferred to the probability as follows [72,73]:    
𝑃 = {
1/10𝐾   , 𝐶𝑃 ≠ 0
0           , 𝐶𝑃 = 0






× 2.301         (5) 
where probability of an input event is denoted by 𝑃, and crisp possibility is identified by 𝐶𝑃. 
In the second method, the probability of each BE (which may be obtained objectively or using reliability data from 
the handbook like as OREDA) is converted to the set of triangular fuzzy numbers with three different confidence, 
such as 25%, 50%, and 75%. This confidence selection is based on the type of study and experts’ opinion. 
According to this change, the probability of TE is computed and behaviour of the system can be easily analysed in 
different confidence levels. 
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Fuzzy modelling or fuzzy IF-THEN rules are another way to handle uncertainty for input variables like BEs. The 
basic structure of fuzzy modelling is illustrated in Figure 4 and is made of the following components: (i) the 
fuzzifier decomposes a reliability system (basic events as the input variables) with crisp numbers and converts the 
crisp numbers into a fuzzy set number; (ii) the inference and reading engine of the fuzzy modelling converts input 
fuzzy sets, based on knowledge, into fuzzy set numbers. Accordingly, “if-then-else” rules are implemented based on 
decision makers’ opinions (for risk index and consequences probability); (iii) the defuzzifier provides an averaging 
and weighting process from all of the separated fuzzy rules for each variable. 
 
Figure 4. The framework of a common fuzzy modelling system 
4.3. Subjective uncertainty handling using Bayesian network  
In the literature, it is stated that Bayesian networks (BNs) have high flexibility compared to FTs, and a FT can be 
substituted by a BN in a risk assessment procedure [74]. Bayesian networks are common in machine learning, 
statistics, artificial intelligence, and risk assessment [75]. To create the corresponding Bayesian network of a FT, as 
illustrated in Figure 5, all elements in a typical FT are converted into the corresponding Bayesian network in which 
the nodes represent variables, Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) assigned to the nodes numerically represent 
conditional dependencies, and arcs signify direct causal relationships between the linked nodes. For each 
intermediate node as well as each leaf node, a CPT is assigned. CPTs demonstrate how intermediate nodes are 
linked to preceding intermediate or root nodes [76]. 
 






































Assuming the conditional dependencies of variables, Bayesian network illustrates the distribution of joint 
probability as 𝑃(𝑈): 
𝑃(𝑈) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 ∣ 𝑋𝑖+1, … 𝑋𝑛)
𝑛−1
𝑖=1                                         (6) 
where 𝑈 = {𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛} and 𝑋𝑖+1is the parent of 𝑋𝑖. Accordingly, the probability of 𝑋𝑖 can be calculated as: 
𝑃(𝑋𝑖) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑈)𝑈∖𝑋𝑖                                                           (7) 
The key advantage of Bayesian networks is in the updating probability mechanism. This ability is usually based on 
expert knowledge or the extra information which becomes accessible in the process lifecycle, including incidents, 
near misses, accidents, mishaps, etc. With respect to Bayes theorem, Bayesian networks can be used to update the 
prior probability of an event [77–80]. The updated or posterior probabilities that decrease the uncertainty and reach 
much more realistic input for each basic event can be calculated as follows:  






                                           (8) 
In order to get more details one can refer to [81–83].  
4.4. Analysis of epistemic uncertainty handling contributions 
From the prior discussion on epistemic uncertainty handling, the terms “fuzziness in FTA” can be further realized 
according to the following points of view. At first, fuzziness is defined as multi-dimensional reasoning in the FFTA 
which formulated in the interval zero and one. Table 1 summarizes the epistemic uncertainty contributions used in 
cited studies. After understanding the fuzziness in FTA, as mentioned earlier the interference mechanisms are 
classified according to three main strategies:    
- A: Probability distribution 
- B: Fuzzy logic-based 
1. Elicitation process 
2. Fuzzy confidence selection 
3. Fuzzy modelling or fuzzy IF-THEN rules 
- C: Bayesian network 
The last column of Table 1 indicates uncertainty handling strategies of three above mentioned types. Figure 6 
displays the main industrial sectors from where the case studies were selected to illustrate the epistemic uncertainty 
handling process in risk analysis or accident modelling analysis based on FTA methods. As can be seen, most of 




Figure 6. Number of papers on subjective uncertainty handling category of FTA in the various industrial sectors 
Table 1. Subjective FTA in various industrial sectors 




Highlights Strategy  





tank (rupture of 
tank) 
All input variables are substituted 
with fuzzy numbers; after utilizing 
fuzzy arithmetic process, the 
probability of TE is then computed.  
B.2 




system (fail to 
capture agent) 
Proposed an approach for a fuzzy 
based using computer and fault tree 
tools.  
B.2 
Celik et al. [85] Marine  Shipping accident 
(break down in 
steam generation 
system) 
Proposed integration of FFTA into a 
shipping accident investigation 
(SAI) 
B.1 




system (SIS) (SIS 
failure) 
Assessing the performance of SIS 
with consideration of CCF. 
Accepting decision makers to share 
their opinions about uncertainty of 




Marine Spread mooring 
system (damage to 
cargo line)  
Proposed a methodology integrating 
the effects of human errors and 






























Shahriar et al. [88] Chemical 
process 
 Oil and gas 
pipelines (gas 
release) 
Explored both subjective 
uncertainty and interdependencies 
among BEs. 
B.1 








Introduced an approach for risk 
analysis of a lean manufacturing 
system using FFTA in one part.  
B.1 
Shi et al. [90] Chemical 
process 
Oil tank (fire and 
explosion) 
Proposed a methodology based on 
FFTA which was improved by 
AHP.  
B.1 
Chen [91] Other  Hoisting operation 
(product damage) 
Hazard analysis of man–machine-
environment system is improved by 
engaging a fuzzy causal model. 
B.2 
Omidvari et al. [92] Chemical 
process 
Distillation tower 
unit in a  process 
plant (reactor 
failure) 
Application of fuzzy logic is 
utilized to obtain the subjective 
opinions of expert for each BE and 
computing the probability of TE.  
B.1 
Martorell et al. [93] Nuclear  Accumulator 
system (failure to 
inject from 
accumulator) 
Proposed a method for assessment 
of risk impacts using FTA based on 
different confidence level of 
probability of BEs.   
- 
Lavasani et al. [94] Marine Permanently 
abandoned 
offshore oil and 
natural X-mast 




The proposed model focuses on risk 
assessment of leakage in a typical 
offshore well using an extension of 
FFTA.  
B.1 
Ramzali et al. [95] Marine Offshore drilling 
system (failure of 
operator) 
The proposed model used fuzzy set 
theory to combine experts’ 
knowledge as an input probability 
for FTA.  
B.1 
Lavasani et al. [96] Chemical 
process 
Deethanizer unit in 
a petrochemical 
company 
The proposed model used fuzzy set 
theory to combine experts’ 













Proposed a model to estimate the 
risk of identified hazards according 
to risk matrix. FFTA is used for 
handling the likelihood factor of 
risk matrix in this regards.  
B.1 





segment (failure of 
drum) 
Proposed a model to calculate risks 
according to the ratio obtained from 
variables of an event using fuzzy 
modelling system.  
B.3 
Yan et al. [99] Other Biomass 
Gasification 
(leakage gas) 
Proposed a model to compute the 
probability of TE based on fuzzy 
probability. 
BN is used for mapping FT and 
considering the dependency 
uncertainty between BE. 
B.1, C   





failure of HIPPS)  
Proposed a hybrid approach 
engaging fuzzy set theory which 
constructs a perfect judgment 








line (𝑈𝐹6 release) 
The proposed model used fuzzy set 
theory to obtain probability of each 
basic event failure as input to the 
probability calculation of  𝑈𝐹6 
release. 
B.1 





Proposed a framework to control 
consistency linked with the 
consistency of employed experts by 
prioritization straightforward fuzzy 
inputs as basic events given to the 
FTA. 
B.1 






Proposed a framework to compute 
probability of TE using fuzzy set 
theory with consideration of 




according 𝛽 factor method.  






Proposed a framework to compute 
probability of TE using fuzzy set 
theory and fuzzy AHP to obtain 
more realistic result.  
B.1 






unit (Ignition of 
vapour cloud). 
Proposed an approach due to risk 
analysis in chemical process 
industries considering uncertainty 
conditions and dependency of basic 
event utilizing fuzzy logic and 
Bayesian network, respectively. 
B.1, C 
Jiang and Wang 
[106] 
Railways Chinese train 
control system 
(system failure) 
Introduced a framework according 
to fuzzy logic in order to cope with 
imprecise expert judgement in FTA.   
B.1 





BP on March 2005 
(Hydrocarbon 
release)   
Proposed a framework to estimate 
the basic event probability in FTA 
using several applications of fuzzy 
logic. 
The results of different methods are 
compared and the advantages and 
disadvantages are discussed.  
B.1 




storage tank (fire 
and explosion)  
Proposed a framework to compute 
the probability of TE using FFTA 
and fuzzy modified TOPSIS to 
obtained effectiveness reduction of 
TE probability.  
B.1 
Yazdi and Soltanali 
[109] 
Automotive Fluid filling 
system 
Proposed a framework using 
intuitionistic fuzzy set to compute 
the probability of TE. 
B.1, C 
Yazdi [110] Automotive Fluid filling 
system 
Proposed a framework using 
intuitionistic fuzzy set theory to 










Proposed an approach for risk 
analysis in chemical process 
industries considering uncertain 





event utilizing fuzzy logic, evidence 
theory, and Bayesian network. 




storage tank (fire 
and explosion)  
Proposed a framework to compute 
the probability of TE using fuzzy 










Proposed a framework to compute 
the probability of TE using 
intuitionistic fuzzy FTA. 
B.1 
 
Following the classification introduced earlier, some of the studies are described in more detail as follows. 
One of the prior studies which used fuzzy set theory to cope with subjective uncertainty during the expert elicitation 
process (Strategy B.1) was performed by Celik et al. [85]. In this study, they established a risk-based modelling 
methodology to increase the performance of shipping accident analysis (SAI). They proposed an extension to fuzzy 
FTA that integrated the effects of organizational failures and shipboard technical system faults using a unique risk 
analysis structure. For this purpose, the similarity aggregation method (SAM) was engaged to aggregate the opinions 
of three employed experts. Additionally, they highlighted that the use of linguistic terms is a proper alternative to 
deal with the uncertainties that arise from basic event probability  
Yazdi and Zarei [107] used different common extensions of fuzzy set theory to aggregate experts’ opinions, which 
are expressed as linquitic terms about the possibility of each BE. They compared the results and listed several 
advantages and disadvantages of each approach. Yazdi et al. [108] also used fuzzy set theory in the same way as the 
previous study to obtain the probability of a chemical accident for a hydrocarbon storage tank. They developed the 
methodology by providing several corrective actions to reduce the probability of each basic event and subsequently 
the top event probability. Fuzzy TOPSIS (technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution) and fuzzy 
AHP were engaged for this purpose. The effectiveness of their proposed approach was illustrated by applying it in 
an industrial application.   
Markowski et al. [84] used strategy B.2 (fuzzy confidence selection) to deal with uncertainty and imprecision due to 
problem solving where uncertainty related to knowledge have a high possibility to occur during obtaining the 
probability of basic events. They concluded that the proposed methodology for computing the basic event’s 
probability confirmed that the outputs are more reliably obtained and have high merits over the conventional single 
point estimation. They also discussed how the chief accomplishment of the approach is due to the failure data 
quality during elicitation as well as on the collaboration with industrial sector plants. Finally, Martorell et al. [93] 
evaluated the risk impacts of variations to limited time using the license source in the nuclear power plant by 
addressing model and epistemic uncertainty. Like fuzzy set theory (Strategy B.2), they used different confidence 
levels. As the selection cannot be fuzzy set theory rules, we consider this paper as independent to other categories. 
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However, the results conclude that the proposed approach has the capability to identify, treat, and analyse epistemic 
uncertainty based on input variables.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
We found no study utilising strategy A (using lognormal distribution) for computing the probability of BEs in the 
journals reviewed. Bedford and Cooke [114] discussed how FTA is based on the decision making process either 
using reliability data handbook or expert elicitation to obtain failure rate of BEs. In other words, it means that the 
subjectivity issue is an unavoidable factor in each step of FTA. Therefore, they introduced a lognormal distribution 
with different confidence levels for this purpose. For a specific case study, using a lognormal distribution with 
consideration of the standard deviation and mean value can provide significant reduction in subjective uncertainty 
for further calculations in FTA [114]. 
Furthermore, subjectivity review analysis showed that the fuzzy logic based methods (strategy B) and elicitation 
process using fuzzy set theory (strategy B.1) have been highly engaged in different types of industrial sectors 
whereas the strategies B.2 and B.3 were used for more specific purposes. It can be notified that fuzzy modelling or 
fuzzy IF-THEN rules (strategy B.3) are more time consuming and have high computational complexity, which force 
system analysers and decision makers to use applications like MATLAB. Thus, using such software is not 
applicable in industrial sector, whereas it may be more suitable for academia. Strategy B.2 (fuzzy confidence 
selection) can introduce ambiguity for decision makers making their final decisions about TE probability. Strategy 
B.2 can be useful when assessors are willing to analyse system behaviour at different confidence levels of reliability. 
When reliability data is available in the industrial sector, assessors seem to prefer to use the exact value instead of 
using a set of values, which introduces many complexities accordingly.   
Bayesian networks (Strategy C), because of their updating feature, can reduce uncertainty by putting new 
information into the system. As mentioned in the literature, subjective uncertainty can be reduced over time because 
of the increased knowledge that we can gain during system operation, which in turn provides more certainty for 
making decisions. Thus, BNs can be a successful way to reduce uncertainty in FTA. However, combining these 
strategies, such as strategy B.1 and C, as was done in some recent studies, can provide more reliable results. It seems 
that the future trend will be to use a combination of different strategies to cope with subjectivity. However, 
introducing a new method can always provide chances for further epistemic uncertainty handling.  
5. Methodological and empirical contributions to aleatory uncertainty 
handling  
FTA for complex engineering systems inevitably involves ambiguities arising from uncertainties in models and 
limitations of the models. The recognition of ambiguities is necessary for effective uncertainty handling. Many 
strategies have been utilized to cope with aleatory uncertainty in recent years and the three most common are 
described below. 
- D: Probability distribution (p-percentile value) 
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- E: Evidence theory 
- F: Bayesian network 
5.1. Objective uncertainty handling using probability theory 
The use of probability distributions is the most common approach to dealing with uncertainty with respect to a 
quantity, whether epistemic or aleatory. The output probability distribution is a demonstration of the decision 
makers’ belief degree which means that it is the probability of the measured quantity to obtain an accepted value. An 
explanation of the approach with respect to the unknown quantities and converting into probability distributions is 
provided below (Strategy D). Once a body of evidence (such as operating experience) becomes available, it is usual 
to modify the probability distribution in order to reproduce the updated information. Bayes’ theorem is extensively 
applied as an analytical tool to update probability distributions. 
The variability of failure and repair times of the components causes that the increasing number of probabilistic 
model to compute the failure probability. Two reliability curves are illustrated in Figure 7 as well as corresponding 
failure rates. The probable reliability value at time t is shown for both curves. Figure 8 illustrates three different 
curves for cases where 𝜆 is equal to the fifth, fifteenth, and ninety-fifth percentiles of 𝜋(𝜆). In these figures, the 
vague quantity 𝑇 is supposed to be normally distributed having standard deviation  0.8 and mean10. 
 




Figure 8. The three different aleatory curves with consideration of continuous epistemic distribution 
Epistemic uncertainty is also handled in this method. A p-percentile value of a random variable is a common method 
for this purpose. Take the sample (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛). It can be expressed as a parameter value e.g. 𝑝% of the data is 
equal or less than to 𝑥𝑝. For more details one can refer to [115]. 
  
5.2. Objective uncertainty handling using evidence theory  
Evidence theory was first proposed by Dempster and further established by Shafer (Strategy E). This theory is also 
known as the D-S theory and is used to overcome the uncertainty of imprecision embedded in the evidence 
[116,117]. Generally, the evidence theory is denoted by some important preliminary notations including a base of 
discernment, BPA (basic probability of assignment), and D-S combination rule, which are briefly explained as 
follows.      
Consider Ω = {𝐻1, 𝐻2, 𝐻3, … , 𝐻𝑁} is a frame of discernment and is a limited non-empty set including N elements, 
which are mutually exhaustive and exclusive. 𝑃(Ω) is denoted as a power set formulated of 2𝑁 elements (Ω). In 
addition, the basic probability of assignments (BPAs) is defined as a conversion of 𝑃(Ω) in interval 0 and 1 which 
means that 𝑚:𝑃(Ω) → [0,1], and satisfies the following conditions.    
𝑚(∅) = 0,  ∑ 𝑚(𝐴) = 1𝐴∈𝑃(Ω)                 (9) 




In circumstances of information shortage, the logical solution is to extend two bounds to the final outputs of the 
uncertainty description. The entire belief degree in “𝐴” is stated by an interval bound as [𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝐴), 𝑃𝑙(𝐴)] that fall 
between zero and one as illustrated in Figure 9. 𝐵𝑒𝑙() and 𝑃𝑙() are denoted as: 
𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝐴) =  ∑ 𝑚(𝐶): 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑐∈𝐴                       (10) 
𝑃𝑙(𝐴) = ∑ 𝑚(𝐶): 𝑐⋂𝐴≠Φ 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦       (11) 
The summation of the BPAs will represent the 𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝐴). In addition, the plausibility degree 𝑃𝑙(𝐴) is computed by 
enhancing the BBAs with intersection by 𝐴 where it is not an empty set.  
 
Figure 9. Plausibility (𝑃𝑙) and Belief (𝐵𝑒𝑙) 
The D-S combination rule integrates two BPAs in a way such that the new BPA denotes an agreement of causal 
parts of evidence. The D-S combination rule is the orthogonal summation of 𝑚1 and  𝑚2 which is defined as [118]: 
m(A) = [m1⊕m2](A) = {
0                                                    if      m1 ∩ m2 = ∅ 
∑ m1(AΙ)m2(AΙΙ)AΙ∩AΙΙ=Ai
1−∑ m1(AΙ)m2(AΙΙ)AΙ∩AΙΙ=∅ 
         if     m1 ∩ m2 ≠ ∅
}     (12) 
where A, AΙ, and AII are subsets of 2
N. 
“Bet” estimation can be defined to give a pignistic probability function which in the belief arrangement will satisfy 
Bet(P): Ω → [0,1] with the same concept as the defuzzification procedure frequently used to signify the defuzzified 




P⊆p      if  m(ϕ) ≠ 1        (13) 
where |Ai| is the number of elements in subset Ai. 
5.3. Objective uncertainty handling using Bayesian network  
The use of Bayesian networks to handle uncertainty in FTA was introduced in section 4.3 (subjective uncertainty). 
However, component failures are typically uncommon events; experimental information for variable approximation 
is usually sparse. Previous method may lead to extreme confidence intervals. In order to handle objective 
uncertainty using Eqs 6-8, the Bayesian network approach can be applied in four steps as follows (Strategy F):  
 
Step 1: Recognition of all variables to be computed 
The failure rate (λ) and demand failure probability (λd) should be computed.  
 






Lognormal distribution is typically used for the prior distribution by computing the median and the error coefficient 
of obtained information. An error coefficient is typically used to identify the lower and the upper boundary limits in 
the distribution: 𝜆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟  =  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛/(𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟) and  𝜆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟  =  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 ×  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. 
The entire range is separated into 𝑛 intervals 𝛿 = (𝜆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 − 𝜆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟)/𝑛 and 𝜆𝑖 values are obtained: 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 +
𝛿 × (𝑖 + 0.5) where i changes between 0 and n.  












)      (14) 
where 𝜇 and 𝜎 are the lognormal distribution parameters and can be calculated as 
ln(Error factor)
1.646
 and ln(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛), 
respectively.  
 
Step 3: Collection of evidence and structure of appropriate probability function 
The probability function applied is the Poisson distribution. The required data (r), comprises the failures rates (𝜆), 
the total operating time (𝑇), demand (D), and the demand rates (d): 




exp (−𝜆𝑖𝑇)   (15) 




exp (−𝜆𝑑𝑇)   (16) 
 
Step 4: Posterior distribution exploitation utilizing Bayes’ Theorem 




                 (17) 
 
where 𝑝(𝜆𝑖) is the PDF of the continuous variable, prior probability𝐵(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟) = 𝑓𝑑(𝜆𝑖), 𝑝(𝐵|𝜆𝑖) is the probability of 
𝐵, given the failure rate 𝜆𝑖  or demand failure probability, and 𝑝(𝜆𝑖|𝐵) is the PDF of failure rate 𝜆𝑖, provided the data 
𝐵 (posterior). Thus, the posterior probability distribution may be computed based on 𝑛 obtained points.  
5.4. Analysis of aleatory uncertainty handling contributions 
As mentioned earlier, problems may arise when an aleatory uncertainty issue is treated as an epistemic one or in 
other words when both uncertainties are mixed with each other. Keeping the uncertainties separate can prevent this 
[63]. However, separating uncertainties from each other is a time consuming task. In order to analyse the aleatory 
uncertainty contributions in this section, it should be added that many studies have been done to handle both types of 
uncertainty simultaneously in FTA. According to Rausand and Hoyland [22], subjectivity will show itself as an 
unavoidable issue for computation of objective uncertainty handling. As an example, using probability distribution 
functions to deal with aleatory uncertainty in FTA, the input data can be the integration of expert knowledge and 
objective data. In this regard, section 6 covers the studies which have been done to deal with both type of 
uncertainties at the same time.   
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Some important studies, which use strategies D, E, and F as input to the FTA, are analysed below. 
Hsiao and Lu [121] highlighted the effects of uncertain parameters on the model reliability for a system protection 
scheme. They proposed an approach for the analysis of a risk-informed SPS design refinement that incorporates 
input uncertainty and sensitivity analysis in FTA. In their proposed method, probability distribution (strategy D) is 
used to obtain failure data to use as an input in FTA. In this case, use of uncertainty bounds is suggested to handle 
both types of uncertainties as a direction for further studies.    
Yang et al. [122] utilized the fuzzy evidence theory (strategy E) in maritime security risk assessment. They state that 
there is a strong requirement for having an approach that takes into account several collection criteria, including the 
effectiveness of measuring cost according to the reasonable security analysis. The reason is that conventional 
methods cannot properly deal with the circumstances having high level of uncertainty. These methods also have lack 
of capability of processing diverse data in a utility form suitable as input to a risk inference mechanism. Thus, to 
cope with these problems, which may commonly occur during FTA procedure, they used strategy E. In the same 
way, Simon and Weber [123] used strategy E to perform a failure analysis in the chemical process industry. In this 
approach, component failure probabilities are modelled as real, interval, and fuzzy numbers to calculate the 
imprecise reliability of a complex system. A similar study was performed by Kelly and Smith [124].   
Yang et al. [125] used probability distribution to analyze aleatory uncertainty in FTA (Strategy D). They tried to 
understand all levels of uncertainty during the risk assessment related to the major hazards in the chemical industry. 
However, they used a Bayesian network to update failure rates of the components in order to combine the generic 
failure data from database and real life data about equipment failure from plant operation to gain knowledge about 
system reliability. The result showed that the uncertainty in the probabilities of basic events have a considerable 
impact on the top event probability. Thus, the approach integrates strategies D and F, which helps to reduce 
uncertainty using the Bayesian updating mechanism on the probability of basic events distribution.    
Wang et al. [126] proposed an approach which integrates Markov models and Bayesian networks to analyze a 
dynamic Bayesian network. They showed that their proposed approach is useful for estimating the dynamic 
probability of fire on an offshore platform. The method initially adapted HFACS (human factor analysis and 
classification system) based on FTA and accordingly converted the FTA to a Bayesian network for further analysis. 
Evidence theory (strategy E) is utilized to compute the prior probability of each failure based on historical data 
which enables handling of objective uncertainty. Another study by El-Gheriani et al. [127] used strategy F to address 
the objective uncertainty between aggregated data.  
In addition, it seems that as with subjective uncertainty handling, the integration of strategies like probability theory 
and the Bayesian updating mechanism can handle aleatory uncertainty in FTA and the trend of publishing papers on 
this topic is likely to increase.  
26 
 
Furthermore, in recent years, one of the popular ways of handling aleatory uncertainty is the use of the Bayesian 
updating mechanism, similar to Strategy C in subjective uncertainty handling. The main difference with strategy F is 
that in this case, FT is firstly mapped into the corresponding Bayesian network and then objective data are used to 
estimate the top event probability. However, a Bayesian network can update the probability of each input by 
providing new information, whether it be objective or subjective. After [128], which compared the use of Bayesian 
networks and FTA to estimate the top event probability, many studies have been performed to estimate the 
probability of TE by mapping FTs into the corresponding BNs, e.g. [79,128–138]. As can be seen from Figure 10, 
the popularity of papers on this topic has increased in recent years.  
 
Figure 10. Distribution of publications on Bayesian network used in the context of safety 
6. Methodological and empirical contributions integrating both epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainty handling 
Classically, researchers have often stated that distinguishing between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty is 
unnecessary. The reason is that based on the axioms of expected-utility decision assessment [139,140], it is 
unrelated in rational selections [141]. Yet, all it requires is a general technique to handle both types of uncertainty. 
The Bayesian probability strategy is one such technique which has enough scope to describe both epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainty. The diverse probability approaches can then be utilized for the decision making procedure. In 
this regard, according to classical points of view, a return to the conventional distinction between epistemic and 
aleatory uncertainty may appear as a step backwards. However, the authors believed that rationality may be viewed 
as much more complicated. Therefore, it is necessary for decision makers to be fully aware of the importance and 
the uncertainty sources before making a knowledgeable decision.  































Table 2. Approaches to handle both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty through FTA in various industrial sectors 




Highlights Strategy  
Ferdous et al.  [142] Chemical 
process  
Liquefied petroleum 
gas (LPG) (runaway 
reaction) 
Proposed an approach which 
emphasises uncertainty handling in 
qualitative risk assessment (QRA). 
The approach used evidence theory 
and fuzzy set theory to handle the 
uncertainties probability of basic 
events.  
B and E 
Ferdous et al. [143] Marine Offshore platform 
(leak from facility) 
Proposed an approach to deal with 
both types of uncertainty and 
minimizing the uncertainty, 
combining expert knowledge and 
prior knowledge updating.   
B,E, and F 
Ferdous et al. [144] Chemical 
process 
Fire and explosion in 
Blow down drum 
(Hydrocarbon 
release)  
Attempted to provide expert 
knowledge to deal with unknown 
information and used evidence 
theory and fuzzy set theory to 
analyze both types of uncertainties.  
B and E 
Martorell et al. [145] Nuclear  Reactor protection 
system (failure to 
insert two or more 
rods) 
Proposed an approach for 
recognition, treatment, and 
assessment of both types of 
uncertainties by integrating them.  
A and D 
Khalil [146] Chemical 
process  
The systems of 
hoydrogen storage for 
light-duty vehicles  
(dust cloud 
explosion) 
Introduced an approach to deal both 
types of uncertainty by developing 
a QRA.  
A and D 
Shoar et al. [147] Chemical 
process  
Arc welding process 
(Incomplete 
penetration 
Proposed hybrid uncertainty 
analysis methods and camping with 
transformation method.  
A and E 
El-Gheriani et al.  
[148] 
Marine Oil and gas well (gas 
leakage)  
Used probability theory and 
Bayesian formalism to cope with 
source to source uncertainty within 
the combined information for each 
basic events and a exact value for 
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(third party damage 
caused) 
Introduced a dynamic framework
for risk assessment with 
consideration of uncertainty 
circumstances demonstrated by 
third-party damage.  
B, C, and 
E 
As can be seen, wide varieties of methods have been combined in recent years to deal with both types of 
uncertainties in the same study. Probability theory and Bayesian networks are more commonly used in this regard. 
However, application of Bayes' theorem provides many advantages over the conventional probability theorem based 
approaches. It seems that the combined application of fuzzy set and evidence theory will grow in the future. 
However, it should be noted that in order to achieve reliable results based on separation of uncertainty types, such 
combination strategies will be costly. For example, expert knowledge must account for the separation, and there is 
massive effort involved in keeping the uncertainty consistently distinct. Furthermore the information must be 
presented in two dimensions and applying sensitivity analysis must also take this into account.  
The separation of uncertainties allows us to review and summarize the variability of the studied population, i.e. how 
decision makers can exactly reference each component and how they can measure the uncertainties based on the 
lack of knowledge [150]. ∎ 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
Over the years, several methods have been established for risk analysis in different industries. FTA is one of the 
most widely used approaches for risk assessment. Like other approaches, uncertainty is unavoidable in fault tree-
based risk assessment techniques. Although in some contexts the terms risk and uncertainty are used 
interchangeably, in this paper, these two terms are assumed to be different. From this point of view, different 
uncertainty handling approaches for fault tree based risk assessment methodologies are reviewed. 
In order to accomplish a proper FTA, probability inputs such as basic event failure probabilities are required. It is 
commonly difficult to obtain a precise probability for the occurrence of a basic event. Two types of uncertainties, 
such as epistemic and aleatory are encountered during obtainment of basic event probabilities. Many strategies have 
been considered in the literature, including probability theory, fuzzy set theory, Bayesian theorem, evidence theory, 
and so on to cope with both types of uncertainties. The viewpoints of each strategy are analyzed in this paper. The 
theoretical and fundamental contributions to uncertainty handling in risk assessment are reviewed to understand how 
it can be further developed.  
Reviewing the existing strategies, we found that a number of methods have been developed to deal with the 
uncertainty in PRA methods. However, the vast majority of these strategies cannot be applied in all circumstances. 
Besides, it may be difficult to explain the reason for choosing a particular strategy to deal with a particular type of 
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uncertainty and whether the chosen strategies are valuable to be researched. Moreover, the application of the most 
existing strategies is confined to a narrow set of fields or activities. PRA methods cover various areas, therefore it is 
necessary to promote the overall benefit of a strategy to deal with uncertainty from a general viewpoint.  
Table 3 shows a comparison between different strategies with regards to their ability to handle uncertainty while 
satisfying different criteria. As it can be seen from Table 3, with compared to the standalone strategies, integration 
strategies have much ability to deal with the uncertainty and cover most of the specified criteria. In other words, the 
integration strategies can promote the overall welfare of a strategy in handling uncertainty in PRA methods.  






Criteria A B C D E F B and E B, E, and F A and D A and E A and F B, C, and E 
C.1 ×   × × ×   × × ×  
C.2   ×   ×   ×  ×  
C.3 × ×  × ×  ×  × ×   
C.4    × ×        
Note: “”means the method has ability to address the issue and “×” means the method cannot address the issue. 
A: Probability distribution (type one) 
B: Fuzzy logic-based 
C: Bayesian network (type one) 
D: Probability distribution (type two) 
E: Evidence theory  
F: Bayesian network (type two) 
C.1: Fuzziness of linguistic scale [69] 
C.2: Local and global elicitation [151] 
C.3. Updating information [82] 
C.4: Adaptability and Resilience to case study [152] 
Hence, compared with existing standalone strategies, the integration of strategies, including B, C, and E has more 
capability to deal with the uncertainty and they are more applicable in different circumstances which inherently has 
a linguistic assessment process, confirm the local and global elicitation, following the updating mechanism, and can 
properly adapt to different conditions. 
Although extensive research has been performed, there exist many challenges that need additional research. For 
instance, the review illustrates that a broad diversity of fuzzy membership functions has been used and they vary 
across application areas. As the definition of a proper membership function has a high effect on the final outputs of 
the risk analysis, it is important to have a reliable methodology to show how to provide a membership function. In 
addition, in this study, most of the fault tree analysis methods taken into account are static; most of the reviewed 
papers assumed components can only either be in failed or non-failed state. However, in complex systems, 
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components can operate in more than two states. Hence, there is scope to perform further research for uncertainty 
handling by considering multi-state systems. Moreover, additional research needs to be carried out to assess 
dynamic extensions of fault tree analysis under conditions of uncertainty. 
The review showed that integration of strategies has a strong ability to handle both types of uncertainties. However, 
most of the efforts have been made to deal with epistemic uncertainty, suggesting it is regarded as being more 
important than aleatory uncertainty. It is necessary to note that iteration of the analysis is highly recommended when 
most of the mentioned strategies are used. In this regard, integrating strategies such as using a Bayesian updating 
mechanism could be considered as the most appropriate method for such an iteration of the analysis. In recent years, 
as stated in [153], Bayesian updating mechanisms have been widely used as an alternative method to fault tree 
analysis because of their flexible architecture and ability to reason about uncertainty. In light of the multiple merits 
provided by the Bayesian updating mechanism, it is worth additional exploration.  
Another important issue worth mentioning is that most of the uncertainty handling approaches reviewed in this 
paper perform the analysis under the assumption that a priori knowledge about the system architecture is always 
available. However, the advancement of technologies has brought loosely connected systems.  Typical examples of 
such systems are Cyber-Physical Systems and the Internet of Things. These are systems where temporary system 
architectures/configurations are formed during operation by combining several smaller systems and these 
architectures may cease to exist after a certain period of time to form a new architecture. As a result, there may exist 
infinite possible configurations of such a system, and it is difficult to ensure certainty about a particular system 
architecture during risk assessment. Therefore, risk assessment of such open systems would require taking into 
account the uncertainty of the system architecture at a certain point in time. This opens new research avenues to 
investigate how a meaningful risk assessment can be performed for open and adaptive systems by taking into 
account the architectural uncertainty. 
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